The Political Economy of EU-funds: Evidence from Poland
Monika Banaszewska , Ivo Bischoff
AbstractWe provide an empirical study analysing the distribution of EU funds among 2478 Polish municipalities in the period 2007–2011. EU funds are found to be concentrated in smaller municipalities and economically weak sub-regions, and do not increase in the municipalities’ fiscal capacity. Our primary focus rests on the question whether regional governments follow their own political self-interest when allocating EU funds even though national parties only play a minor role in Polish local politics and thus the conventional logic of supporting aligned governments does not apply. Difference-in-difference estimations show that the answer is affirmative: Municipalities whose voters are aligned with the regional government receive more EU funds per capita than non-aligned municipalities. Furthermore, we find support for the swing-district hypothesis: EU funds per capita decrease in the vote-share differential between the two leading parties.
|Journal series||Jahrbucher Fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, ISSN 0021-4027, (A 20 pkt)|
|Publication size in sheets||1.65|
|Keywords in English||EU, cohesion funds, Poland, local government, party alignment, swing districts, vertical grants|
|ASJC Classification||; ;|
|Score||= 20.0, 30-09-2019, ArticleFromJournal|
|Publication indicators||: 2017 = 0.594; : 2017 = 0.456 (2) - 2017=0.428 (5)|
|Citation count*||8 (2020-09-10)|
* presented citation count is obtained through Internet information analysis and it is close to the number calculated by the Publish or Perish system.