The Political Economy of EU-funds: Evidence from Poland

Monika Banaszewska , Ivo Bischoff


We provide an empirical study analysing the distribution of EU funds among 2478 Polish municipalities in the period 2007–2011. EU funds are found to be concentrated in smaller municipalities and economically weak sub-regions, and do not increase in the municipalities’ fiscal capacity. Our primary focus rests on the question whether regional governments follow their own political self-interest when allocating EU funds even though national parties only play a minor role in Polish local politics and thus the conventional logic of supporting aligned governments does not apply. Difference-in-difference estimations show that the answer is affirmative: Municipalities whose voters are aligned with the regional government receive more EU funds per capita than non-aligned municipalities. Furthermore, we find support for the swing-district hypothesis: EU funds per capita decrease in the vote-share differential between the two leading parties.
Author Monika Banaszewska (WE / KFP)
Monika Banaszewska,,
- Department of Public Finance
, Ivo Bischoff - University of Kassel, Germany
Ivo Bischoff,,
Journal seriesJahrbucher Fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, ISSN 0021-4027, (A 20 pkt)
Issue year2017
Publication size in sheets1.65
Keywords in EnglishEU, cohesion funds, Poland, local government, party alignment, swing districts, vertical grants
ASJC Classification1400 General Business, Management and Accounting; 2002 Economics and Econometrics; 3301 Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Languageen angielski
Score (nominal)20
ScoreMinisterial score = 20.0, 30-09-2019, ArticleFromJournal
Publication indicators Scopus SNIP (Source Normalised Impact per Paper): 2017 = 0.594; WoS Impact Factor: 2017 = 0.456 (2) - 2017=0.428 (5)
Citation count*8 (2020-09-10)
Share Share

Get link to the record

* presented citation count is obtained through Internet information analysis and it is close to the number calculated by the Publish or Perish system.
Are you sure?