Single good exchange model with changeable preferences given as a two-sided matching

Joanna Siwek

Abstract

Markets are usually considered as strongly efficient – each investor is said to have the same information at the same time. But due to incomplete, false or vague information on the market, significant data have become an expensive good. Thus, the accessibility to it may vary. In the following paper a behavioural approach to decision-making is presented. An investor’s decision to enter a trade is based on multiple criteria such as knowledge, personal experience, investing history and individual characteristics. All those factors are reflected in individual investor’s preference toward a short or long position in a trade of good. In the paper we present two exchange models of an arbitrary good, where information about the market is reflected in investors’ preferences. A two- -sided matching approach for choosing contract sides is given. Simulations of market dynamics, including asymmetry and changeability of information, are performed and a possible equilibrium is discussed. The main idea of this paper is to research possible states of market equilibrium on the basis of behavioural factors and describe its usefulness for modelling market dynamics.
Author Joanna Siwek (WIiGE / KBO)
Joanna Siwek,,
- Department of Operations Research
Journal seriesMultiple Criteria Decision Making, ISSN 2084-1531, (B 12 pkt)
Issue year2015
Vol10
Pages155-165
Publication size in sheets0.5
Keywords in Englishtwo-sided matching, exchange model, game theory
URL http://mcdm.ue.katowice.pl/files/papers/mcdm15(10)_10.pdf
Languageen angielski
Score (nominal)12
ScoreMinisterial score = 12.0, 31-03-2019, ArticleFromJournal
Ministerial score (2013-2016) = 12.0, 31-03-2019, ArticleFromJournal
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